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BRIGID BROPHYÕS PRO-ANIMAL FORMS 
 
Abstract 
 
This essay discusses two linked aspects of Brigid BrophyÕs work as a pro-animal 
writer of literature. These are her determined usurping of the human hierarchy and 
prestige that permit violence toward animal life, and her concomitant reliance on the 
potential of literary-formal creativity to prosecute it. I trace these elements in the text 
that contains the majority of BrophyÕs literary-fictional writing about animals, The 
Adventures of God in his Search for the Black Girl (1973), discussing the short novel 
in the form of a conte philosophique which goes by that title and a number of short 
pro-animal fables that are collected with it. Drawing on archive materials, the 
discussion situates BrophyÕs literary practice in the context of her influential 
journalism, essays, artworks made with Maureen Duffy, her work in support of early 
animal rights authors and a recently discovered 1972 Open University interview on 
the topic of animal rights. A broader aim of the essay is thereby to properly recognize 
BrophyÕs significance in the literary history of contemporary writing that challenges 
anthropocentric attitudes to animals. WomenÕs writing is where one must look first 
for this development, in the work of key figures such as Margaret Atwood, Angela 
Carter, Maureen Duffy, Patricia Highsmith, Ursula Le Guin, and Alice Walker. Yet, 
on the literary wing of the academic field of animal studies, which has burgeoned 
over the last fifteen years or so by discussing such figures, BrophyÕs work has been 
almost entirely forgotten. 
 
Introduction 
 
It would not be unjust to claim that the contemporary Anglophone animal rights 
movement properly began with a literary act by Brigid Brophy. On 10 October 1965 
the Sunday Times published BrophyÕs essay ÒThe Rights of Animals,Ó heralding its 
new ÒMinority ViewÓ strand (which, in fact, promptly folded). Some six years later, 
however, the book Animals, Men and Morals (1971) appeared: it collected the work 
of a loose group of scholars and activists, including Brophy, and emerged from 
discussions in Oxford around 1970 that were stimulated by her Sunday Times essay. 
Brophy was instrumental in the bookÕs publication: the editors, Stanley Godlovitch, 
Rosalind Godlovitch and John Harris, had originally planned a historical anthology, 
with BrophyÕs ÒThe Rights of AnimalsÓ as the starting point. Then, under her 
auspices, they discussed this project with the publisher Michael Joseph, and in turn 
BrophyÕs friend Livia Gollancz and Giles Gordon, an editor at Gollancz, who 
challenged them to produce new material.
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 The resulting book was reviewed, at his 
urging, by the philosopher Peter Singer in the New York Review of Books, under the 
title ÒAnimal Liberation,Ó on 5 April 1973. ÒWe are familiar with Black Liberation, 
Gay Liberation, and a variety of other movements,Ó Singer writes, and Òwith 
WomenÕs Liberation we thought we had come to the end of the roadÓ; but ÒAnimals, 
Men and Morals is a manifesto for an Animal Liberation movementÓ (Singer 17). In 
1977 Brophy herself, reflecting on ÒThe Rights of AnimalsÓ at a symposium given the 
same title, reiterates the theme of animalsÕ situation in the history of progressive 
social reform: Òthere was both a logical and psychological necessity in basing the 
claim for other animalsÕ rights on social justice,Ó because Òthe high barrier we have 
put up between the human species and all the rest of the animal species É is 
essentially a class barrierÓ (Brophy, ÒDarwinistÕs DilemmaÓ 64, 63). Inspired by the 
ÒmanifestoÓ to which BrophyÕs work had given rise, Singer went on to develop his 
own arguments for animal liberation; these, in critical conversation over the following 
decades first with others working in the enlightenment moral tradition, and then with 
those from feminist, environmentalist, sceptical and continental philosophical 
standpoints, provide the broad intellectual co-ordinates for pro-animal thought today 
(see Calarco).  
 
 Here is how BrophyÕs ÒThe Rights of AnimalsÓ begins; it is breath-taking in 
more ways than one. 
 
Were it announced tomorrow that anyone who fancied it might, without risk of 
reprisals or recriminations, stand at a fourth-storey window, dangle out of it a 
length of string with a meal (labelled 'Free') on the end, wait till a chance 
passer-by took a bite and then, having entangled his cheek or gullet on a hook 
hidden in the food, haul him up to the fourth floor and there batter him to death 
with a knobkerrie, I do not think there would be many takers (Brophy, ÔRightsÕ 
45). 
 
This one-sentence paragraph is vintage Brophy, full of rhetorical flourish worked to 
perfectly deliberate and meaningful ends: from the hypotactic style of multiply 
embedded and parenthetical clauses to the unexpected way with vocabulary causing 
delicate tonal shifts (from ÔdangleÕ to Ôcheek or gulletÕ to the delightfully disarming 
exoticism, ÔknobkerrieÕ). The balance of syntactical complexity and bluntly rendered 
violence is arresting enough; but the sentenceÕs full literary force lies in the way that 
it enacts upon its reader a satirical pastiche of the very violent activity it offers to 
critique. A more or less unexpected reversal of species fortunes is executed at the 
level of content by way of its ingenious re-description of the reality of angling: fish, 
riverbank, bait, line and gaff become human, apartment window, meal, string and 
knobkerrie. But Brophy has yet more stylistic fun with a reversal whereby the reader 
is caught by her rhetoric. The sentence actually angles for us. The actuality of baiting 
is reworked as ear-catching alliteration and defamiliarizing imagery that is as visually 
compelling as physically shocking. AnglingÕs characteristic dramatic arc of 
possibility, waiting, strenuous effort and reward is removed to the subjunctive mood 
of the sentence and the long delay while Brophy holds us on a grammatical line until 
the resolution of the last clause. And yet this, ironically enough, tells not of capture 
but of getting away. It is not, as we might expect, the bait in the sentenceÑthe free 
mealÑfor which there are no takers, but the macabre act of intra-species fishing itself 
(despite her love of puns, Brophy refrains from calling it ÒhumanglingÓ). The 
notionally murderous sportsmen of BrophyÕs allegory (or rather, she implies cynically, 
most of them) eventually reveal a capacity to choose ethically and reject violence 
against their own kind. Perhaps, the literary challenge goes, if the presumably pro-
angling readers of the Sunday Times do not like being exhaustively played by this 
sentence, they should not do the same to fish. Thus, a leisurely pursuit has been the 
victim of BrophyÕs purely literary blood-sport.  
 
I have begun by reading this moment in such close detailÑfoundational as it 
is for contemporary critical moral thought about animalsÑbecause it encapsulates the 
two linked aspects of BrophyÕs work as a pro-animal writer of literature that it is the 
principal purpose of this essay to illustrate and discuss. These are her determined 
usurping of the human hierarchy and prestige that permit violence toward animal life, 
and her concomitant reliance on the potential of literary-formal creativity to prosecute 
it. In what follows, then, I trace these elements in the collection that contains the 
majority of BrophyÕs literary-fictional writing about animals, The Adventures of God 
in his Search for the Black Girl (1973); I will discuss the short novel in the form of a 
conte philosophique that has the same title and a number of short pro-animal fables 
that are collected with it. My discussion situates these pieces in the context of 
BrophyÕs journalism, essays, artworks exhibited with Maureen Duffy, and a recently 
discovered 1972 interview on the topic of animal rights. 
 
A larger aim of this essay, however, is to go some way towards properly 
recognizing BrophyÕs significance in the literary history of contemporary writing that 
challenges anthropocentric attitudes to animals. The field of womenÕs writing is 
where one must look first for this development, particularly in the work of a variety of 
authorsÑsome major and some less well-known figuresÑsuch as Margaret Atwood, 
Angela Carter, Barbara Gowdy, Patricia Highsmith, Ursula Le Guin, Deborah Levy, 
Ruth Ozeki, and Alice Walker. Indeed, even amongst those male writers whose work 
is significant in this regardÑincluding, in the postwar period, J. R. Ackerley, James 
Agee and Arthur Miller, and after them Timothy Findley, Michel Faber and, 
principally, J. M. CoetzeeÑit is remarkable to observe how consistently the 
imagination turns to female protagonists to explore the ethical valences of human 
encounters with animals. And yet, on the literary wing of the academic field of animal 
studies, which has burgeoned over the last fifteen years or so by discussing some of 
these figures, BrophyÕs work has been almost entirely forgotten. Of the key works of 
criticism that focus on the figure of the animal in contemporary literature, all of which 
situate themselves in relation to pro-animal thought, only Philip Armstrong and 
Randy Malamud pay any attention to Brophy, and even then only in the briefest 
discussions of her first novel HackenfellerÕs Ape (1953).
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 My intent here, then, is to 
rectify this dearth of attention by moving now from her moral journalism to a fuller 
account of her pro-animal thought and aesthetics, before analysing how these develop 
and take their fullest form in her short stories of the 1970s. 
 
2. BrophyÕs Pro-animal Thought and Aesthetics 
 
Underpinning the deeply ambivalent attitudes that circulate in contemporary society 
about animals and their use for human ends is a widespread and profound sense of 
species identity. This characteristically takes two forms: an ideologically schematic 
oneÑwe are humans and not animalsÑand a biologically descriptive oneÑwe are 
human rather than x, y or z other species of animal. The first of these is only 
apparently more dubious than the latter. The wholesale rejection of embodiment 
implied by the former has too many pernicious consequences to be tenable; and we 
have learnedÑfrom evolutionary biology as much as from Michel FoucaultÕs The 
Order of Things (1966)Ñthat the discrete categorisation of species is unstable at best. 
One impact of a strong sense of human species identity, however, is the assumption 
that the most basic or homiletic of moral propositions, howsoever universally they are 
phrased, need not hold across the supposed barrier between humans and other species 
of animal: the principle of access to justice, for example, or the golden rule. If we hear 
this idiomatically as Ôdo unto others as you would have them do unto youÕ it is 
possible that the ÔothersÕ might very well be nonhuman, but Luke 6:31 in the King 
James Version makes the species aspect clear: Ôas ye would that men should do to you, 
do ye also to them likewiseÕ. For almost everyone, it is (and this word is apposite 
here) natural to assume that the human species is a kind of club of which we cannot 
but be members. Yet this is also an exclusive club: animals certainly are not included 
and so it stands to reason that there are member benefits that they just do not receive.  
 
 This sense of species as so straightforwardly limited and delimitedÑa notion 
which has been termed as Òhuman exceptionalismÓ, and in its specifically moral form 
ÒspeciesismÓÑis something that Brigid Brophy quite determinedly rejects.
3
 She does 
so precisely because of her avowed humanismÑcomplicated though this is by her 
great enthusiasm for the Freudian theory of the unconsciousÑand her unwavering 
insistence on the particular duties of humans, in contrast to other animals, in the 
exercise of reason in revealing morality.
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 Just as did Richard Ryder in the opening 
paragraph of the eponymous 1970 leaflet which coined the term Òspeciesism,Ó Brophy 
attacks human exceptionalism broadly on the basis of the necessary biological 
continuity which she follows Darwin in finding between humans and animals, and 
which undermines the supposed discreteness of biological species (Ryder).  
 
 Brophy develops this point in her contribution to a radio programme about 
vivisection, one of the earliest broadcast discussions on the topic of animal rights, 
which was produced by the BBC for the second year students of ÒThe Biological 
Basis of BehaviourÓ at the Open University in 1972.
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 Perhaps surprisingly prejudging 
the pedagogic outcome of a debate aimed at students, Steven Rose introduces the 
programme with his no-nonsense take on the matter of the species club and the 
privileges that come with it: ÒI have a very straightforward species loyalty, to the 
human species, and I set every human above any animal.Ó Nevertheless, Brophy 
argues, beginning with a monastic allusion that is quite deliberate: 
 
The habit of mind which permits vivisection seems to me to rest on superstition, 
not on science. It is the book of Genesis which gives man dominion over the 
animals, and modern biology is founded on not taking the book of Genesis as a 
biology text-book. As I understand it, modern biology does not present a picture 
in which there is man on one side, and then a huge gap, and then all the other 
animals; it presents man as himself an animal, one of a large number of 
(sometimes more closely related to him, sometimes less) animal species. 
 
The point here draws directly on her essay in Animals, Men and Morals, which offers 
a startling cultural-psychoanalytic argument about humanityÕs Òunrealistic fantasy 
relationships to the other animals,Ó which, in the case of vivisection, involve a fantasy 
of aggression (Brophy, ÒIn PursuitÓ 136-40). Brophy is here applying to human-
animal relations an analysis she extends with exceeding ambition to the whole of 
Western civilisation in her magnum opus Black Ship to Hell (1963). This work argues, 
following late Freud, that the achievements of human culture are best understood as a 
product of the sublimation of a fundamental drive towards aggression.
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 For Brophy, 
the persistence of divinely-sanctioned speciesism amongst an avowedly rationalist 
and post-Darwinian scientific establishment is evidence that the systematic reliance 
on vivisection in experimental science is based on tradition rather than necessity. She 
sees this dogmatism as irrational and of a piece with the self-contradiction implicit in 
the widespread moral hand-wringing about the experimental use of animals that 
coincides with a persistent justification that it is necessary to save human lives. For 
Brophy, it is on the contrary quite straightforward that Òthe moral thing to do about a 
moral dilemma is circumvent itÓ and not just bemoan it (Brophy, ÒIn PursuitÓ 124). 
Therefore, when public moral concern about vivisection is taken together with the 
self-evident fact that society makes almost no effort to seek, fund, or disseminate 
information about alternatives to it, Brophy interprets such ineffectual moral qualms 
about animal suffering as a cover for continuing to pursue an unconscious fantasy of 
cruelty towards animals. This is a good example of how BrophyÕs psychoanalytic 
thinking renders her humanism complex. For all that humanity is supposedly 
separated from the animal world by its rationality, even the most apparently refined 
expression of that feature, which is experimental science, reveals deep unconscious 
cross-species entanglements. 
  
 These matters are taken up in a particularly sharp exchange in the novel 
Brophy was writing around this time, The Adventures of God in his Search for the 
Black Girl (1973).
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 The work takes the metafictional form of a series of peripatetic 
quasi-philosophical dialogues, established between a self-consciously fictional ÒGodÓ 
and various literary-historical luminaries (Voltaire, Edward Gibbon, Bernard Shaw 
himself) together with a Òhumble Christian.Ó Amongst these dialogues is a 
particularly good example of the way Brophy holds scientific inquiry to account for 
its implicitly non-rational biases, and to its own principles as a discipline of 
enlightenment. Taking up RoseÕs word ÒloyaltyÓ from the Open University interview, 
Brophy has God critique the ChristianÕs axiomatic anthropocentrism: 
 
ÒOf course,Ó the humble Christian replied. ÒHumans matter more.Ó 
  ÒTo whom?Ó God asked. ÒTo me? I assure you, science knows nothing of me 
or of my scale of values. IÕm not a scientific concept. Nowhere in the fossil 
record can you read my authorisation of manÕs dominion over animals. If you 
mean humans matter more to humans, yes of course they do. But it is the 
scientific duty of science to make corrections, so far as it can, for the 
anthropocentric bias that results from the fact that scientists are humans.Ó É 
  ÒYou can hardly blame biologists,Ó the humble Christian said, Òif they shew 
loyalty to their own species. Personally I think loyalty is a commendable 
quality.Ó 
  ÒDo you commend the Nazis,Ó God asked, Òfor the fact that their loyalty to 
their German nationality led them to feel justified in torturing and, indeed, 
experimenting on Jews and Gypsies?Ó (Brophy, Adventures 167-68) 
 
The stakes are high, of course, in using this example, which is BrophyÕs own entry 
into what is by now a (decidedly ignominious) sub-genre of pro-animal critiqueÑthe 
appeal to the history of Nazism to rebuke animal abuse.
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 But Brophy certainly should 
not be taken to be pressing this analogy as far as equating the two realms (Jews and 
nonhuman animals). She is without doubt sanguine about causing offence by referring 
to the Holocaust in this analogical way, but her purpose is to illuminate a specific 
ground of comparison: the use of group loyalty to licence systematic violence. More 
precisely, though, the collocation of anthropocentrism and ethnocentric nationalism 
here nods to something crucial in BrophyÕs pro-animal thinking: its consonance with 
her internationalism, which tends towards faith in a supra-national political order 
(Brophy, Black Ship 39-44). It is only in her adult lifetime that political discourse 
came to avoid the dogmatic preference for oneÕs own ethnos, something we find in 
loud international political appeals for generic Òhuman rightsÓ after the Second World 
War. And yet, in the light cast by BrophyÕs expansive post-Darwinian sense of living 
in a more-than-human community, the notion of Òthe human raceÓ itself can only 
offer a tendentious and fantasmatic kind of solidarity, just like ÒnationhoodÓ or race 
itself. And consequently, a dogmatic preference for humans, like patriotism, seems to 
promote a similar kind of ethnocentrism. 
 
 Of course, it is one thing to make this argument (or, indeed, to have God make 
it) but it is another entirely to confront, as a writer who no longer shares it, a world 
that holds to the Òhabit of mindÓ that humans are radically different from the rest of 
the animal kingdom, and for which the sense of being human that is shaped by that 
ÒhabitÓ is perhaps the most elementary co-ordinate of identity. Here, it is helpful to 
come back to the word I used earlier to describe the force of that elementary sense, 
which might be thought Ònatural.Ó On this point, here is BrophyÕs fictional Voltaire: 
 
I long ago saw through RousseauÕs and many other peopleÕs fallacious belief 
that there is, for human beings, some ÒnaturalÓ state, to which they only have to 
revert for all to go well. For humans the only natural state is to be endlessly, 
inventively and variably artificial. Man is not a bower-bird, whose instinct will 
instruct him how to build nests, all to the same pattern. His instinct is to devise 
original patterns. Man is man only insofar as he is hundreds of individual 
architects (Brophy, Adventures 178). 
 
Notwithstanding the underestimation of the aesthetic creativity and artifice of bower-
birds here (see Lingis), I believe that this point about human ÒnatureÓ would also be 
BrophyÕs. The assertion that it is human nature to be artificial seems neatly to 
encapsulate so much of her critical and aesthetic sensibility: both in the form itself, 
the wry wit of its paradox, and in its insistence on the pre-minence of formÑof 
design, pattern, madenessÑin human life. This all goes to insist that it is illusory to 
make appeals to an untouchable foundation for moral belief that is not designed and 
built by human consciousness, and as such open to change.    
 
 There is an important point to make here, which may be understood as the root 
explanation why Brophy does not, in response to the speciesist Òhabit of mind,Ó offer 
literary representations of animal life that have any semblance of realism. Her 
aesthetic purpose is quite different from nineteenth century models of pro-animal 
writing. The most famous of these is the development of animal autobiography in the 
form of a series of works culminating famously with Anna SewellÕs Black Beauty 
(1877) and Margaret Marshall SaundersÕs Beautiful Joe (1893) (see DeMello). This 
notwithstanding, Brophy gives a perfectly succinct explanation and endorsement of 
the rationale behind the cultivation of sympathetic imagination that drove those 
developments. She considers that the Òclass barrierÓ already mentioned between 
humans and animals is no more than an extension of Òthe original class distinction É 
between Me and all the rest of You.Ó She continues, however, that 
 
there arises in most of us (perhaps not in psychopaths) a faculty of imagination 
(I can only label, not describe it), which informs Me that to you, You are a Me. 
It is this faculty, with its ability to inhabit the other side of the barrier, that 
knocks the class barrier [Òbetween Me and All the Rest of YouÓ] down (Brophy, 
ÒDarwinistÕs DilemmaÓ 64). 
 Nevertheless, BrophyÕs fiction offers very little by way of rich narratives of animal 
life, sympathetically imagined or otherwise; and she certainly is very reticent to 
present animal consciousness at all, let alone realistically. This is because such moves, 
by whole-heartedly gambling on the power of imagination to inhabit the animal other, 
can both forego the sense of their own artifice. Moreover, by cultivating sentiment for 
and emotional affinity with animals, they establish the ground of ethical consideration 
not in rigorous argument but an inchoate human feeling like love. This is something 
which, for Brophy, is Òcapricious and quite involuntary,Ó (Brophy, ÒDarwinistÕs 
DilemmaÓ 65) which is to say dangerously close to a dogmatic or conventional 
preference and so too shaky a ground for ethical action when compared to rationally 
argued duty.  
 
 When Brophy does represent animals, she avoids this problem with a literary 
method at the very furthest extreme of anthropomorphism, which ensures that 
emotional identification with the animal is redirected into something necessarily more 
cerebral. BrophyÕs only fully-fledged animal characters appear in the early short-story 
ÒLate Afternoon of a Faun,Ó (1952) in which two young deer debate the civilizational 
benefits of Roman classicism; in Pussy Owl (1976), a childrenÕs book which is a 
hilarious and self-consciously nonsensical exploration of narcissistic egotism; and in 
HackenfellerÕs Ape. This text is also far from straightforwardly ÒaboutÓ animals, 
although it does betray some of BrophyÕs later and more radical interests. It is clearly 
concerned with the moral implications of human-animal relations, such as zoo-
keeping; the use of animals in state-controlled technoscience; humansÕ evolutionary 
history, and the connections between instinct, education and other biological and 
cultural influences on human behavior (see McCorry on this). But BrophyÕs fictional 
simians, Percy and Edwina, are primarily imaginative tropes that serve a 
philosophical purpose: their proto-humanity offers a limit-case that acts as a fictional 
strategy for thinking through unresolved questions about human existence (albeit 
understood in continuity with animal life) and not for imagining animal lives per se. 
At the fullest level, HackenfellerÕs Ape, which predates BrophyÕs adoption of anti-
vivisectionism and vegetarianism, which she dates to 1954, is a novel about the 
correspondence of scientific inquiry and artistic creativity (Brophy, Reads 131). It 
considers how these twin forms of human understandingÑwhich Brophy persists in 
holding in relation throughout her workÑimplicate self-knowledge, observation and 
control in human sexual and personal freedom. That is to say, it is a novel that is 
intellectually most committed to her developing interest in psychoanalysis, which 
flourishes in Black Ship to Hell. 
  
 If not to exercise, or promote, sympathetic imagination on behalf of animals, 
what is the critical logic offered up by BrophyÕs insistence on artifice and form, in the 
context of her writing about animals? I will highlight three elements. First, appeals to 
ÒnatureÓÑany essentialist claims about humanityÑare ruled out of court when 
discussing human attitudes; second, as we have already seen, appeals to tradition are 
also unacceptable; and finally, she rejects appeals based on dogma of whatever sort. 
These three bugbears lead Brophy to privilege aesthetic strategies that countermand 
them and the speciesist hegemony they support. By way of the characteristically 
postmodern practices of pastiche, dtournement, and the parodic inhabiting of other 
forms, Brophy draws reflexive attention onto the way that ideologically-loaded 
attitudes about animals are naturalized.  
 In fact, the aspect of ideological commentary that is involved here is first 
explored not in fiction or critical journalism, but via a collaborative foray into art-
making, in the form of an almost completely forgotten exhibition of works made with 
Maureen Duffy, exhibited as Heads and Boxes: Items of Prop Art at the MasonÕs Yard 
Gallery, London, in May 1969. The exhibition included twenty-five Òheads,Ó crafted 
from polystyrene wigstands in the form of busts, made by attaching or appending 
various texts and other items, and twenty nine Òboxes,Ó which are small dioramas or 
three dimensional collages constructed inside the clear plastic boxes that held the 
wigstands. According to criticism of these works, they offer Òvisual puns, parodies, 
and set pieces of humourÓ (Russell). Clearly conceptual in intentÑthey were on show 
in a locale that is now synonymous with early conceptual art in BritainÑthese works 
combine disparate artistic media in an exercise of the trans-liminal imagination that 
characterizes BrophyÕs novel of the same year, In Transit. As the artistsÕ manifesto 
puts it, punning on the words image and readymade (the general medium of the 
pieces), the works are ÒreadymagesÓ: Òequivalents, in another medium, to poems: 
lyrics, epigrams (slightly in the ancient world sense), satires, squibs, marseillaises or 
metaphysical extravaganzasÓ (Brophy and Duffy).
9
 A particularly relevant piece, here, 
is the counter-Romantic Little Lamb, Who Flayed Thee?, a pastiche of the opening 
line of William BlakeÕs ÒThe LambÓ: ÒLittle lamb, who made thee?Ó (see Russell). 
BlakeÕs reflection on divine creation is punned into a darker reflection on and 
indictment of human destruction of animal life. Indeed, animals appear in several of 
the works of which images survive: Treesons, punning on ÒtreasonsÓ, which can be 
read as both a pacifist statement and a parody of anthropocentric notions of evolution, 
includes a gorilla on all fours, a standing gorilla, a crusader, a Roman centurion, and a 
parachutist, all beside the words ÒGenialogyÓ and ÒApocalypseÓ.
10
 Others include 
Bipolarity in which two polar bears face off, and ÒAunt-EaterÓ (figure 1). Speaking of 
this piece in an interview, Brophy explained that she and Duffy Òsaw this ant-eater in 
a toyshop window. We are both vegetarians. This is a simple revenge reversal. One is 
on the animalÕs side. One sympathises with the animal. Well, who would you like to 
eat?Ó (Carter). 
 
 
[INSERT Figure 1, Brigid Brophy and Maureen Duffy, Aunt Eater] 
 
Brophy goes on to develop the sharp humor and meta-stylistic method 
developed in the Prop Art exhibition, using it in her fiction satirically to attack 
received wisdom about animals and human-animal relations. She does so by turning 
towards metafictional forms in her writing: the staged philosophical dialogue, as we 
have seen, and the fable. Brophian fables reimagine a canonical literary form that 
conventionally holds together animal representation and moral thought. Hers are quite 
different from the brief, anthropomorphic and maxim-carrying vignettes of the 
Aesopic tradition. However, even whilst they share elements of the humorous tone 
and satirical force that can be found in its twentieth century exponentsÑsuch as 
Ambrose BierceÕs Fantastic Fables (1899), William MarchÕs 99 Fables (1960), Suniti 
NamjoshiÕs Feminist Fables (1981) and David SedarisÕs Squirrel Seeks Chipmunk 
(2010)ÑBrophyÕs fables retain an interest in human foibles where beasts are absent 
as textual voices. The satire is embedded in linguistic and textual ironies rather than 
embodied in animal characters. These textsÕ main effect is to parody the conventions, 
both intellectual and stylistic, that shape the various ways humans have of telling 
stories about animals. The remainder of the essay will focus on explaining these 
strategies in action by way of brief close readings of three pro-animal fables collected 
in The Adventures of God in his Search for the Black Girl (1973): ÒDocumentary,Ó 
ÒHomo SapiensÓ and ÒClassic Detective Story.Ó 
 
3. Reading BrophyÕs Pro-Animal Fables 
 
ÒDocumentaryÓ is a two-page pastiche of the Òand finallyÉÓ format of light-hearted 
stories which appear at the close of television news reports, or perhaps of Òhuman 
interestÓ stories in other magazine formats (part of the wit of BrophyÕs pastiche is that 
its tone is broad enough to hit several targets). Here is how the story opens; the prose 
is a masterpiece patchwork of clich: 
 
Do you ever take time out to reflect, before you fall asleep in the warmth and 
safety which we call Òhome,Ó that there are those for whom the coming of night 
spells not the end but the beginning of toil? 
  Year in year out, storm or calm, at just about the time you are kissing your 
loved ones goodnight, the little fleet assembles and, leaving home and loved 
ones far behind, heads out into the deep waters to face the perils of the unknown, 
often in conditions of indescribable hardship (Brophy, Adventures 48). 
 
The butt of the satire here is the hokey, platitudinous and cockle-warming portrayal of 
the fishing industry, which is an essential component of twentieth-century pastoral 
genres.
 
This attitude spreads from mass-market texts to the filmic documentary form 
that gives the story its title, for example John GriersonÕs famous Drifters of 1929Ñ
which William Empson discusses in Some Versions of Pastoral, a book we can 
assume Brophy would have knownÑand in a number of films that were released 
around the time of writingÑsuch as Trawler Town (1960), The Disappearing Island 
(1964) and In Great Waters (1974). The story spins almost too many conventional 
tropes to count:  the contrast between the toil of the trawler-worker and the comfort of 
the urban consumer; the netherworld of fishing as a night activity; the melancholy of 
the trawlermanÕs exile from home; the masculine strength and sacrifice of 
trawlermen; the picturesque quality of their work; the diversity of the fleet as a little 
nation; and the functional excellence of the boat as a fully working factory in itself. 
 
 Offering an even more fantastical variation on the theme set out in the opening 
sentence of ÒThe Rights of Animals,Ó the storyÕs satire is shaped by a relatively 
straightforward if macabre reversal in which humans become food and fish are their 
captors. Clichs usually attached to representations of the trawler fleet are instead 
offered as descriptions of sea-creatures that feast on the humans lost at sea: Òa motley 
crew [É] in all shapes and sizes, from the majestic armoured might of the killer shark 
[É] to the brave little shoals of mackerelÓ (48). By the end of the story, BrophyÕs 
love of puns takes hold and we are told of Òpicturesque manning villagesÓ and 
religious ceremonies remembering the ÒMiracle of Loaves and Men.Ó This is a good 
example of punning as defamiliarisation, designed to critically distance the reader 
from the implied authority of the ÒhumanÓ interests that underpin the human interest 
story: humans should eat fish; fish should not eat humans. The larger satirical logic of 
the story finds this tendentious. Here, we encounter the key principle of BrophyÕs 
morality with respect to animals: evolutionary continuity leads to an emptying out of 
the absolute value of the human whose values with respect to life and death are 
necessarily relative to othersÕ; fish prefer not to be eaten just as humans do, and so 
there is no solid justification for eating them. 
 
 To conclude this reading, it is important to note that the word documentary 
means both a textual record and something pertaining to instruction or teaching. The 
documentary offered by the story, then, is a record not about fishing, but about the 
various narrative tropes that are offered in place of accurately and truthfully 
documenting fishing activity, tropes which populate the story with unwarranted 
sentiment. The conventional nature of human interests is replicated in the 
conventionality of the textual form of the human interest news story itself. 
ÒDocumentaryÓ draws critical attention to the aesthetically and ethically loaded style 
of the apparently neutral stories about human-animal relations that surround us in 
everyday life; that is on their formed (as opposed to necessary) nature. Indeed, this is 
how Brophy attacks all her fundamental targetsÑartificiality presented as 
authenticity; ideology presented as common sense; tendentiousness presented as 
honesty; received wisdom and habit presented as profundity; and the complex politics 
of human hegemony celebrated as simplicity with a nave charm. Her technique of 
parodic mimicry draws attention to the fallen world of ethics beyond the story, in 
which no appeal to an outside authority can finally justify human behavior. ItÕs only 
through the ÒmadeÓ nature of texts that we come to see the interested (as opposed to 
disinterested) and self-serving nature of the conventional thematics of fishing.  
 
The fable ÒHomo SapiensÓ takes up a similar technique of inhabiting an 
ostensibly positive story and a particular textual mode only to undermine the human 
priorities that are apparent in them. However, compared to ÒDocumentary,Ó it offers a 
considerably stranger and more insidious kind of satire. This comes about because of 
a radical shift in the scale of the textual world, from the relatively minor and domestic 
to the expansive and the environmental. The fable begins in a starkly elegiac mode, 
almost mythic, which mimics the pervasive apocalyptic tone of green critique at the 
time of its writing: ÒThe great lake is dead.Ó From the limited, recognisable and 
realistic society of trawler fishing communities, the focus shifts here to a generic and 
more-or-less abstract world so that the existential stakes may be significantly raised. 
Concomitant with this, as the fable unfolds there is a shift from the emotionally 
bathetic homilies of the TV news and magazine report to the grand and disembodied 
political-speak of the state-sponsored, public-information message. This tone is 
blended with the commanding imperatives and social cohesion-enforcing third-person 
plurals of apocalyptic campaigning propaganda, as in the following example.  
 
  We need an enormous effort, and it must be a corporate effort.  
  Everyone, from the picnicking family careless with its litter to the giant 
factories that discharge their effluent É must be alerted to the responsibility 
they bear to the common good. É 
   Against the killers, individual greed and mass inertia, we must utilise every 
weapon at our commandÉ Ordinary citizens must make a tremendous 
affirmation in favour of Life (Brophy, Adventures 27). 
 
Some context is useful here, to explain how this technique relates to the storyÕs pro-
animal purpose. Adventures was published in 1973, the year which also saw the BBC 
broadcast the historian of science Jacob BronowskiÕs anxious but finally optimistic 
story of evolutionary progress for humanity, The Ascent of Man. This reiterates a 
quite conventional anthropocentric idealizing of evolution as an apparently 
unmotivated unfolding of life as a natural force but which is supposed to reach its 
telos with the flourishing of knowledge in Homo sapiens. The story ÒHomo Sapiens,Ó 
however, offers an entirely different and more cynical development: from ecological 
self-awareness about anthropogenic environmental damage based on greed, to 
political will in pressing for a change of behavior towards conservation and 
preservation of habitat, to instrumentalizing the resulting natural resources by using 
them up for pleasure, to redeveloping this utilisation of nature into the kind of 
industrialized practice that initially caused the damage. The storyÕs unusual formÑ
one and a half pages long with three short, fragmentary and imagistic sections, each a 
little longer than the precedingÑthus has an important effect. It pastiches the 
progressively developing movement of evolution, a favourite notion of humanism, 
with a kind of ironic and self-defeating political convolution in which history does 
nothing more than compulsively repeat the destructiveness of human self-interest.  
 
ÒHomo SapiensÓ ends by capturing one of the deepest ironies of human-
animal relations, seen across practices such as meat-eating, indigenous species 
conservation, and public health management: this is the ease with which the 
systematic killing of nonhumans is incorporated into a positive ideal of healthy or 
enhanced life.
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  Along the paths run children in bright sunsuits waving butterfly nets. 
  On the banks, beside the gay canvas chairs of the weekend anglers, hundreds 
of fish choke their lives out. É 
  Proof that ecological death is reversible is afforded by the fact that the great 
lake now supports a thriving commercial fishing industry. In the factory by the 
lakeside thousands of fish lie belly-up, decapitated, being packed by 
automation. 
  Man has achieved a great triumph on the side of Life (Brophy, Adventures 
28). 
 
The style here offers the events of the story as only obliquely instructive. Largely 
because it withholds the humorous satirical bite of ÒDocumentary,Ó the reader is 
offered a much less comfortable position from which to be critical of the ideas that are 
parodied. We are asked, instead, to ponder on events, not quite as riddles, but as 
evidence of some obscure or paradoxical truth about human self-interest. Rather than 
being understood and resisted this can at best only be vaguely divined, and perhaps no 
more than endured. The storyÕs pessimism, in keeping with its implicit critique of the 
optimistic notion of evolutionary humanism, reveals a deep cynicism about moral 
progress. As Brophy puts it elsewhere: 
 
to the impulse towards egalitarianism and social justice I ascribe no historical 
or political coherency, and still less any historical inevitability. If there is 
anything so coherent as a movement, it has made such huge detours that you 
could often think it was moving backwards (Brophy, ÒDarwinistÕs DilemmaÓ 
63). 
 
As she surveys the various violent commodifications of animal bodies that she 
wants to critique, a basic challenge for Brophy as a pro-animal writer is that society at 
largeÑand with it the force of lawÑdoes not perceive such activities to be morally 
wrong. This simple fact necessarily renders unworkable many literary-fictional forms, 
such as suspense, that rely on shared expectations about rights and wrongs, and about 
what is irreproachable and what will be punished. It also a reason why Brophy 
eschews writing animal fiction in the sentimental tradition, which draws the reader 
towards emotional reproaches of animal abuse that pretend to exceed the hard 
politico-legal reality, and which risk reinforcing the psychoanalytically ambivalent 
dynamic of human-animal relations which was previously explained in her diagnosis 
of vivisection. This is seen in the fact that many of the social aspects of treating 
animal bodies as commoditiesÑsuch as the reliance on euphemism and the general 
preference for the deathly reality of meat to be kept out of sightÑseem to smack of a 
kind of cultural bad-conscience, a point Brophy makes more than once (Brophy, 
Black Ship 133 and Adventures 190). The irony, then, is that the use of animal body 
parts by humans, depending on the context, might be so utterly unquestioned as to be 
made visible with some delightÑfor example elegantly tanned leather or 
gastronomically prepared meatÑwhile so troubling to the conscience that the process 
of production needs shamefully to be secreted.  
 
 In recent years, the most significant literary-theoretical account of the 
specifically rhetorical qualities of this set of attitudes has been Carol J. AdamsÕs idea, 
which she repurposes from the work of Margaret Homans on nineteenth century 
womenÕs writing, of the living animal as the Òabsent referentÓ of speciesist culture. 
Whereas the animalÕs life is destroyed by commoditizing it, the animal itself, as the 
inherently valuable subject of that life, is occluded by linguistic and cultural tropes 
(such as using the word ÒmuttonÓ instead of Òcooked dead sheepÓ). Adams 
recommends a strategy of Òrestoring the absent referentÓ and wonders:  
 
could it be that literary consciousness is paradigmatic for vegetarian 
consciousness? A phenomenology of vegetarianism recapitulates the 
phenomenology of writing: of seizing language, of identifying gaps and silences 
(Adams 184). 
 
The idea, here, is that the exemplary vegetarian-cum-writer delivers the linguistic 
honesty that fills those ideological gaps and silences. It is a consoling possibility, and 
one that approaches BrophyÕs defamiliarising fictions, but these, I think, in the end 
offer something different, more exacting and perhaps more pessimistic. 
 
 A case in point here is ÒClassic Detective StoryÓ. This begins in a very 
unusual way, with a chapter which takes the form of a diagram detailing the layout of 
a library, with desk, French doors and a book-lined wall: we do not yet know that this 
is a crime scene. Chapter two begins with a second diagram, this time of a breakfast 
table, with seating arrangement and food-lain sideboard. The rest of the story unfolds 
in the shape of an elaborate pastiche of the very pulpiest of Golden Age detective 
fictions.
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 It apes many effects of the genre, from the country house setting and 
stereotyped cast of upper-class characters, to the clunky exposition of plot detail by 
having one character bluntly tell it to another. The twist, however, is that the detective 
says nothing, reveals nothing, and indicts no-one before quietly leaving the room. 
Instead, the characters work out for themselvesÑwith the help the clich based on a 
nave young woman who recognizes what no-one else canÑthat the solution to the 
locked-room ÒmysteryÓ is that the seemingly missing body is to be found in the calf-
skin books, the tooled leather on the desktop and the meats laid out on the sideboard 
because the invisible murderers are the butcher and the tanner. 
 
 On the one hand, the subversive drama of this story might seem to offer a 
good example of Òrestoring the absent referent,Ó but it is subtly and significantly 
different. By displacing the detection of the crime on to the characters, who promptly 
laugh it off as Òtoo trivial,Ó ÒClassic Detective StoryÓ suggests that detecting, or 
having the simple knowledge-power to reveal the truth about violence towards 
animals, is not enough to stop it. When compared to the ethical authority of the 
campaigner who insists that animals have rights, or that meat is murderÑand of 
course outside her fiction, this is Brophy tooÑthe detectiveÕs silence speaks 
eloquently to a more disquieting truth which it is the purpose of BrophyÕs pro-animal 
literary experimentation to reveal. There may well be no higher authority than human 
intelligence to refer to when divining how to behave ethically; but the essentialist, 
traditional and dogmatic preference of humans for humans means that appealing to an 
earthly legislating or policing authority is, also, beside the point. This is ironically 
personified at the end of ÒClassic Detective StoryÓ when Lady Artemisia Chase 
insists, fully of moral probity, that she ÒwouldnÕt hurt a flyÓ but then insouciantly 
does precisely that when it comes near her food (87-88). For Brophy, a new morality 
of human-animal relations will emerge not simply by seeking any kind of truth, but by 
re-reading and re-imagining the world with care; a process that can have no definitive 
prosecution. As BrophyÕs Voltaire ironically puts it: ÒHumans are such inveterate 
mammals [É]. They are never happy until they have put a construction on the 
universe that makes it a mirror of their own infancy, with a parental hand always in 
the offing to protect or chastiseÓ (156). The astonishing insight of BrophyÕs pro-
animal writing, then, is that to make good ethical sense of the story of animalsÕ rights, 
we must learn how to tell without the help of an author, just as we must learn how to 
read, entirely new stories of who we are.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
It has been my purpose here to offer a synoptic analysis of the full range of BrophyÕs 
moral, aesthetic and psycho-social thought about human-animal relations, and how 
these inform and are bodied forth in her journalistic and social commentary and her 
artistic and literary practice. Doing so reveals her great significance for the 
development of late twentieth century cultural reflection on, and social action to indict, 
humanityÕs derelict treatment of animal life. 
 
Her importance in terms of literary influence is somewhat harder to pinpoint, a 
challenge made more difficult by critical neglect. That said, it is certainly possible to 
find isolated examples that seem to follow in BrophyÕs footsteps, such as Deborah 
LevyÕs Diary of a Steak or the recent BBC film Carnage by Simon Amstell. Each of 
these shares BrophyÕs interest, which I have traced in depth here, in connecting 
intensive formal experiment, psycho-social thought and pointed critique in the realm 
of animal ethics.
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 Perhaps BrophyÕs most surprising and significant (although as yet 
unremarked) influence, however, appears on the work of J. M. Coetzee, and in 
particular his metafictional novella The Lives of Animals (1999). This is a text which 
is near ubiquitous in critical discussion of contemporary fiction about animals, as it is 
in the academic field of animal studies in general (McKay 2010). Such discussions 
draw heavily on the pro-animal and literary-aesthetic arguments of its central 
character and presiding voice, the fictional novelist Elizabeth Costello. Costello is a 
witty if sometimes cantankerous writer, known for her metafictional strategies, who is 
given to offering risky analogies (such as between animal use and the Holocaust) and 
is most outspoken in her commitment to animal rights. This commitment is developed 
in critical analysis of the prejudices and hypocrisies of anthropocentric morality and 
rooted fundamentally in heeding the ethical claim of the sympathetic imagination. 
Such a description of the fictional Costello, without doubt the predominant literary 
influence on thought about animals today, is also a perfect portrait of her critically 
neglected real-life precursor, Brigid Brophy.
14
 
 
My claim here, though, has not quite been that critics have overlooked a direct 
influence that Brophy has had on contemporary fiction about animals, whether in the 
example of her personality or of her work. As I have argued, rather, BrophyÕs writing 
is interested in the representation of animals less in the aesthetic than in the political 
sense. Indeed, her style of writing about animals and its literary-formal innovations 
are closely tied to a quite particular aesthetic, which encompasses stylistic, 
psychoanalytic and moral thought in a very specific way. In finally assessing her 
influence, then, the significant point is surely that it is difficult to properly read any 
fictional representation of animals now without some understanding of the raised 
ethical stakes of human-animal relations in the contemporary west, an understanding 
that BrophyÕs work continues to inspire.  
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1
 I am grateful to Stanley Godlovitch, John Harris and David Wood for 
correspondence confirming the details of BrophyÕs influence. 
                                                                                                                                                              
2 See Armstrong 187, 196-7; Malamud; see also Herman, McHugh, Pick, Simons, and 
Wolfe, Animal Rites. 
3
 For explanatory discussion of speciesism and human exceptionalism see Boddice. 
4
 Indeed, given the intellectual allegiance of work in literary animal studies with 
various critiques of humanism and with posthumanism, this is a likely to be a 
significant factor in BrophyÕs absence from consideration in the field (see Wolfe 
Posthumanism). 
5
 I am grateful to Richard Ryder and staff at the Open University archive for helping 
me to discover a recording of this programme in 2015; it was held uncatalogued in the 
Open University archive. The views expressed on the programme are not those of the 
Open University. 
6
 See Freud. Black Ship to Hell also addresses the subject of vivisection (174-77). 
Another example of the way BrophyÕs thought has been overlooked in the 
development of animal studies is the fact that she extends her argument to include a 
cultural psychoanalysis of the concepts of sacrificial scapegoating and of meat-eating 
which is remarkably close to the important and widely-cited analysis of Òcarno-
phallogocentrismÓ offered by Jacques Derrida (Brophy, ÒIn PursuitÓ 141-42, Derrida 
280-81). 
7
 The title plays on George Bernard ShawÕs The Adventures of the Black Girl in Her 
Search for God (1932), whose eponymous heroine, incidentally, carries a knobkerrie. 
8
 See Patterson for a textual history and analysis of this comparison, which is found in 
the work of writers from Isaac Bashevis Singer and Theodor Adorno to J.M. Coetzee 
as well as pro-animal polemic. 
9
 I am grateful to Kate Levey for allowing me access to the unpublished manifesto 
and catalogue made by the artists, which are in her private collection; thanks also to 
                                                                                                                                                              
Maureen Duffy for permission to reproduce material here. Given the lack of published 
evidence of this show, it is understandable that BrophyÕs work with Duffy (another 
overlooked contemporary writer about animals) should be missing from the best 
contemporary histories of art that focus on animals; this is despite its significance and 
comparability to more well-known (male) conceptualists such as Joseph Beuys, Hans 
Haake or Marcel Broodthaers (see Baker, Broglio). 
10
 A somewhat inaccurate report of this piece, incorrectly titled, is offered in Barbara 
WrightÕs review (Wright); I am grateful to Kate Levey for providing an illumination 
of an undeveloped negative photograph of this piece. 
11
 Brophy is offering here an early version of what has recently emerged in animal 
studies, alongside a broader critique of discourses of Òlife,Ó as a biopolitical analysis 
of human animal relations (see Wolfe, Hunt and Youngblood). 
12
 See Horsley 35-52. 
13
 See Levy, Amstell, McKay 2006 and Leszkiewicz. 
14
 Although it is very likely, there is no evidence to my knowledge that Coetzee 
knows of BrophyÕs life or writing. There are some surprisingly close similarities 
between their works, though: for instance both BrophyÕs HackenfellerÕs Ape and 
CoetzeeÕs Disgrace feature alienated academics, both condemned for sexual 
improprieties, who after reflecting on animal ethics seek some form of solace by 
attempting to communicate with an animal by badly performing operatic music to it. 
